Learning from Iraq : counterinsurgency in American strategy /

Metz, Steven, 1956-

Learning from Iraq : counterinsurgency in American strategy / Counterinsurgency in American strategy Steven Metz. - Carlisle, PA : Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, [2007] - viii, 127 p. ; 23 cm.

"January 2007."

Includes bibliographical references (p. 91-127).

The deadly bloom -- The road to Baghdad -- We planned for the wrong contingency -- Residual pockets of resistance -- A massive and long-term undertaking -- They had the training to stand and fight -- A powerful, deeply symbolic myth -- The prospect of an outright victory -- The core conflict has changed -- Adjusting transformation -- Transcending counterinsurgency -- A strategic after action review.

While the involvement of the United States in counterinsurgency has a long history, it had faded in importance in the years following the end of the Cold War. When American forces first confronted it in Iraq, they were not fully prepared. Since then, the U.S. military and other government agencies have expended much effort to refine their counterinsurgency capabilities. But have they done enough?



1584872721 9781584872726

2007361643


Counterinsurgency--United States.
Iraq War, 2003-


United States--Strategic aspects.

U241 / .M111 2007

355.02/18