TY  - BOOK
AU  - Tucker,Paul M.W.
TI  - Unelected power: the quest for legitimacy in central banking and the regulatory state 
SN  - 9780691176734 (hardback : alk. paper)
AV  - HG 1725 T893u 2018
U1  - 332.1 23
PY  - 2018///]
CY  - Princeton
PB  - Princeton University Press
KW  - Banks and banking
KW  - State supervision
KW  - Banking law
KW  - Financial institutions
KW  - Government policy
KW  - Monetary policy
KW  - Bancos
KW  - Supervisión estatal
KW  - Supervisión del estado
KW  - Instituciones financieras
KW  - Política gubernamental
KW  - Derecho bancario
KW  - Política monetaria
KW  - Nonfiction
N1  - Incluye referencias bibliográficas (páginas [579] -610) e índice; Welfare : the problem, and a possible solution --
Values : democratic legitimacy for independent agencies --
Incentives : the administrative state in the real world : incentives and values under different constitutional structures --
Power : overmighty citizens? the political economy of central banking; power, legitimacy, and reconstruction
N2  - Central bankers have emerged from the financial crisis as the third great pillar of unelected power alongside the judiciary and the military. They pull the regulatory and financial levers of our economic well-being, yet unlike democratically elected leaders, their power does not come directly from the people. Unelected Power lays out the principles needed to ensure that central bankers, technocrats, regulators, and other agents of the administrative state remain stewards of the common good and do not become overmighty citizens. Paul Tucker draws on a wealth of personal experience from his many years in domestic and international policymaking to tackle the big issues raised by unelected power, and enriches his discussion with examples from the United States, Britain, France, Germany, and the European Union. Blending economics, political theory, and public law, Tucker explores the necessary conditions for delegated but politically insulated power to be legitimate in the eyes of constitutional democracy and the rule of law. He explains why the solution must fit with how real-world government is structured, and why technocrats and their political overseers need incentives to make the system work as intended. Tucker explains how the regulatory state need not be a fourth branch of government free to steer by its own lights, and how central bankers can emulate the best of judicial self-restraint and become models of dispersed power.--
ER  -