000			03640cam a2200493 i 4500
999			_c112299 _d112299
003			BJBSDDR
005			20230411090105.0
007			ta
008			180221s2018 nju b 001 0 eng d
020			_a9780691176734 (hardback : alk. paper)
020			_a0691176736 (hardback : alk. paper)
035			_a(OCoLC)on1004944749
040			_aYDX _bspa _cYDX
041			_aeng
042			_alccopycat
043			_an-us---
050	0	0	_aHG 1725 _bT893u 2018
082	0	0	_a332.1 _223
100	1		_aTucker, Paul M. W., _d1958-
245	1	0	_aUnelected power : _bthe quest for legitimacy in central banking and the regulatory state / _cPaul Tucker.
246	3	0	_aQuest for legitimacy in central banking and the regulatory state
264		1	_aPrinceton : _bPrinceton University Press, _c[2018]
300			_axii, 642 p. ; _c25 cm.
336			_atext _btxt _2rdacontent
337			_aunmediated _bn _2rdamedia
338			_avolume _bnc _2rdacarrier
504			_aIncluye referencias bibliográficas (páginas [579] -610) e índice.
505			_aWelfare : the problem, and a possible solution -- Values : democratic legitimacy for independent agencies -- Incentives : the administrative state in the real world : incentives and values under different constitutional structures -- Power : overmighty citizens? the political economy of central banking; power, legitimacy, and reconstruction.
520			_aCentral bankers have emerged from the financial crisis as the third great pillar of unelected power alongside the judiciary and the military. They pull the regulatory and financial levers of our economic well-being, yet unlike democratically elected leaders, their power does not come directly from the people. Unelected Power lays out the principles needed to ensure that central bankers, technocrats, regulators, and other agents of the administrative state remain stewards of the common good and do not become overmighty citizens. Paul Tucker draws on a wealth of personal experience from his many years in domestic and international policymaking to tackle the big issues raised by unelected power, and enriches his discussion with examples from the United States, Britain, France, Germany, and the European Union. Blending economics, political theory, and public law, Tucker explores the necessary conditions for delegated but politically insulated power to be legitimate in the eyes of constitutional democracy and the rule of law. He explains why the solution must fit with how real-world government is structured, and why technocrats and their political overseers need incentives to make the system work as intended. Tucker explains how the regulatory state need not be a fourth branch of government free to steer by its own lights, and how central bankers can emulate the best of judicial self-restraint and become models of dispersed power.-- _cProvided by Publisher.
650		0	_aBanks and banking _xState supervision.
650		0	_aBanking law.
650		0	_aFinancial institutions _xGovernment policy.
650		0	_aMonetary policy.
650		4	_aBancos _911585 _xSupervisión estatal
650		4	_aBancos _911586 _xSupervisión del estado
650		4	_aInstituciones financieras _xPolítica gubernamental _97039
650		4	_aDerecho bancario _911587
650		4	_aPolítica monetaria _91662
655		4	_aNonfiction.
776	0	8	_aTucker, Paul. _tUnelected power. _dPrinceton : Princeton University Press, 2018 _z9781400889518 _w(OCoLC)1030823090
906			_a7 _bcbc _ccopycat _d2 _eepcn _f20 _gy-gencatlg
942			_2lcc _cBK