000 03079cam a2200433 i 4500
001 129573
005 20230410105249.0
008 150807s2016 dcua b 001 0 eng
035 _a18761132
010 _a 2015025240
020 _a9781626162815
_q(pbk. : alk. paper)
020 _z9781626162839
_q(ebook)
040 _aDGU/DLC
_beng
_cDGU
_erda
_dDLC
041 _aEng
042 _apcc
043 _an-us---
_ad------
050 1 4 _aUA 23
_bP531c 2016
082 0 0 _a327.1/170973
100 1 _aPfundstein Chamberlain, Dianne.
245 1 0 _aCheap threats :
_bwhy the United States struggles to coerce weak states /
_cDianne Pfundstein Chamberlain.
260 _aWashington, D.C. :
_bGeorgetown University Press,
_c[2016]
300 _axii, 270 p. :
_bill. ;
_c24 cm
504 _aIncludes bibliographical references (pages 241-260) and index.
505 0 _aIntroduction : too cheap to compel -- The logic of costly compellence -- U.S. compellent threats 1945-2007 -- The 1962 Cuban missile crisis -- The 2011 Libya crisis -- The 1991 threat against Iraq -- The 2003 threat against Iraq -- Conclusion : the implications of costly compellence for theory and policy -- Appendix. Description of how the dataset was constructed.
520 _aThe United States has a huge advantage in military power over other states, yet it is frequently unable to coerce weak adversary states with threats alone. Instead, over the past two decades, the leaders of Iraq, Haiti, Serbia, Afghanistan, and Libya have dismissed US threats and invited military clashes. Why have weak states risked and ultimately suffered catastrophic defeat when giving in to US demands earlier might have allowed their survival? Why was it necessary to use force at all? Pfundstein finds that the United States' compellent threats often fail because the use of force has become relatively cheap for the United States in terms of political costs, material costs, and casualties. This comparatively low-cost model of war that relies on deficit spending, air power, high technology, and a light footprint by an all-volunteer force has allowed the United States to casually threaten force and frequently carry out short-term military campaigns. Paradoxically, this frequent use of "cheap" force has made adversary states doubt that the United States is highly motivated to bear high costs over a sustained period if the intervention is not immediately successful.
651 0 _aUnited States
_xMilitary policy.
651 0 _aUnited States
_xMilitary relations
_zDeveloping countries.
651 0 _aDeveloping countries
_xMilitary relations
_zUnited States.
650 0 _aMilitary art and science
_xDecision making.
650 0 _aStrategy.
651 4 _aEstados Unidos
_xPolítica militar.
651 4 _aEstados Unidos
_xRelaciones militares
_zPaíses en desarrollo.
651 4 _aPaíses en desarrollo
_xRelaciones militares
_zEstados Unidos.
650 4 _aCiencia militar
_xToma de decisiones.
650 4 _aEstrategia militar.
942 _2lcc
_cbk
946 _advf
985 _aGUCIP
_d2015-08-26
999 _c33201
_d33201