000 | 03079cam a2200433 i 4500 | ||
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001 | 129573 | ||
005 | 20230410105249.0 | ||
008 | 150807s2016 dcua b 001 0 eng | ||
035 | _a18761132 | ||
010 | _a 2015025240 | ||
020 |
_a9781626162815 _q(pbk. : alk. paper) |
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020 |
_z9781626162839 _q(ebook) |
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040 |
_aDGU/DLC _beng _cDGU _erda _dDLC |
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041 | _aEng | ||
042 | _apcc | ||
043 |
_an-us--- _ad------ |
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050 | 1 | 4 |
_aUA 23 _bP531c 2016 |
082 | 0 | 0 | _a327.1/170973 |
100 | 1 | _aPfundstein Chamberlain, Dianne. | |
245 | 1 | 0 |
_aCheap threats : _bwhy the United States struggles to coerce weak states / _cDianne Pfundstein Chamberlain. |
260 |
_aWashington, D.C. : _bGeorgetown University Press, _c[2016] |
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300 |
_axii, 270 p. : _bill. ; _c24 cm |
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504 | _aIncludes bibliographical references (pages 241-260) and index. | ||
505 | 0 | _aIntroduction : too cheap to compel -- The logic of costly compellence -- U.S. compellent threats 1945-2007 -- The 1962 Cuban missile crisis -- The 2011 Libya crisis -- The 1991 threat against Iraq -- The 2003 threat against Iraq -- Conclusion : the implications of costly compellence for theory and policy -- Appendix. Description of how the dataset was constructed. | |
520 | _aThe United States has a huge advantage in military power over other states, yet it is frequently unable to coerce weak adversary states with threats alone. Instead, over the past two decades, the leaders of Iraq, Haiti, Serbia, Afghanistan, and Libya have dismissed US threats and invited military clashes. Why have weak states risked and ultimately suffered catastrophic defeat when giving in to US demands earlier might have allowed their survival? Why was it necessary to use force at all? Pfundstein finds that the United States' compellent threats often fail because the use of force has become relatively cheap for the United States in terms of political costs, material costs, and casualties. This comparatively low-cost model of war that relies on deficit spending, air power, high technology, and a light footprint by an all-volunteer force has allowed the United States to casually threaten force and frequently carry out short-term military campaigns. Paradoxically, this frequent use of "cheap" force has made adversary states doubt that the United States is highly motivated to bear high costs over a sustained period if the intervention is not immediately successful. | ||
651 | 0 |
_aUnited States _xMilitary policy. |
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651 | 0 |
_aUnited States _xMilitary relations _zDeveloping countries. |
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651 | 0 |
_aDeveloping countries _xMilitary relations _zUnited States. |
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650 | 0 |
_aMilitary art and science _xDecision making. |
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650 | 0 | _aStrategy. | |
651 | 4 |
_aEstados Unidos _xPolítica militar. |
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651 | 4 |
_aEstados Unidos _xRelaciones militares _zPaíses en desarrollo. |
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651 | 4 |
_aPaíses en desarrollo _xRelaciones militares _zEstados Unidos. |
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650 | 4 |
_aCiencia militar _xToma de decisiones. |
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650 | 4 | _aEstrategia militar. | |
942 |
_2lcc _cbk |
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946 | _advf | ||
985 |
_aGUCIP _d2015-08-26 |
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999 |
_c33201 _d33201 |