000			03106cam a2200433 i 4500
001			118583
005			20230410115521.0
008			131204s2014 enk b 001 0 eng
035			_a17962598
925	0		_aacquire _b1 shelf copy _xpolicy default
942			_2lcc _cbk
010			_a 2013045299
020			_a9781107031340 (hardback)
040			_aDLC _beng _cDLC _erda _dDLC
042			_apcc
043			_aee-----
050	1	4	_aHD3616.E8523 _bS36 2014
082	0	0	_a322/.30947 _223
084			_aPOL040000 _2bisacsh
100	1		_aSchoenman, Roger.
245	1	0	_aNetworks and institutions in Europe's emerging markets / _cRoger Schoenman.
264		1	_aCambridge : _bCambridge University Press, _c2014.
300			_axiv, 226 pages ; _c24 cm
336			_atext _2rdacontent
337			_aunmediated _2rdamedia
338			_avolume _2rdacarrier
490	0		_aCambridge studies in comparative politics
504			_aIncludes bibliographical references (pages 196-215) and index.
520			_a"Do ties between political parties and businesses harm or benefit the development of market institutions? The post-communist transition offers an unparalleled opportunity to explore when and how networks linking the polity and the economy support the development of functional institutions. A quantitative and qualitative analysis covering eleven post-socialist countries combined with detailed case studies of Bulgaria, Poland and Romania documents how the most successful post-communist countries are those where dense networks link politicians and businesspeople, as long as politicians are constrained by intense political competition. The comparison of original network datasets shows how this combination allowed Poland to emerge with stable institutions. Bulgaria, marred by weak institutions, corruption and violence, cautions us that in developing economies intense political competition alone is harmful in the absence of dense personal and ownership networks. Indeed, as Romania illustrates, networks are so critical that their weakness is not mitigated even by low political competition"-- _cProvided by publisher.
505	8		_aMachine generated contents note: Introduction; Part I. Foundations: 1. Approaches to institution building; Part II. The Role of Networks: 2. When broad networks increase cooperation; 3. Tracing ownership networks; Part III. The Role of Uncertainty: 4. When uncertainty increases cooperation; 5. Tracing elite career networks; Part IV. Bringing It Together: 6. Institutional development in new democracies; 7. Conclusion: political varieties of capitalism in emerging markets.
650		0	_aBusiness and politics _zEurope, Eastern.
650		0	_aBusiness networks _xPolitical aspects _zEurope, Eastern.
650		0	_aPost-communism _xEconomic aspects _zEurope, Eastern.
650		0	_aInstitution building _zEurope, Eastern.
651		0	_aEurope, Eastern _xEconomic policy.
650		7	_aPOLITICAL SCIENCE / Government / General. _2bisacsh
856	4	2	_3Cover image _uhttp://assets.cambridge.org/97811070/31340/cover/9781107031340.jpg
946			_aJaaM
999			_c42760 _d42760