Learning from Iraq : counterinsurgency in American strategy / Steven Metz.
Material type:
- 1584872721
- 9781584872726
- Counterinsurgency in American strategy
- 355.02/18 22
- U241 .M111 2007
Item type | Current library | Home library | Collection | Shelving location | Call number | Vol info | Copy number | Status | Date due | Barcode |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
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Biblioteca Juan Bosch | Biblioteca Juan Bosch | Recursos Regionales | Recursos Regionales (2do. Piso) | U241 .M111 2007 (Browse shelf(Opens below)) | 3 | 1 | Available | 00000056323 |
"January 2007."
Includes bibliographical references (p. 91-127).
The deadly bloom -- The road to Baghdad -- We planned for the wrong contingency -- Residual pockets of resistance -- A massive and long-term undertaking -- They had the training to stand and fight -- A powerful, deeply symbolic myth -- The prospect of an outright victory -- The core conflict has changed -- Adjusting transformation -- Transcending counterinsurgency -- A strategic after action review.
While the involvement of the United States in counterinsurgency has a long history, it had faded in importance in the years following the end of the Cold War. When American forces first confronted it in Iraq, they were not fully prepared. Since then, the U.S. military and other government agencies have expended much effort to refine their counterinsurgency capabilities. But have they done enough?
Electronic version also available on the SSI website.
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